Vogel v. Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc.
Middle District of
Case No. 07-062
December 30, 2008
This matter is before the Court on a Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge [Document # 34], which was filed and served on the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b). Plaintiff filed timely Objections. The Court has now reviewed the Objections and the portions of the Recommendation to which objection was made, and has made a de novo determination in accord with the substance of the United States Magistrate Judge's rulings. The Magistrate Judge's Recommendation [Document # 34] is therefore affirmed and adopted, and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss will be granted.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Recommendation is ADOPTED and for the reasons set out in the Recommendation, Defendants' Motion to Dismiss [Document # 23] is GRANTED. As a result of this determination, Plaintiff's claims for false designation of origin under the Lanham Act (Count 2) and unfair and deceptive trade practices under state law (Count 3) are DISMISSED. In addition, Defendant John Q. Trojanowski is DISMISSED for lack of personal jurisdiction. The sole remaining claim in this case is Plaintiff's claim for copyright infringement under the Copyright Act (Count 1) against Defendants Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc. d/b/a Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, Wolters Kluwer United States, Inc., and Wolters Kluwer U.S. Corporation, and that claim will go forward in this case.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND RECOMMENDATION
WALLACE W. DIXON, United States Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the court on a motion to dismiss by all Defendants (docket no. 23). Plaintiff Francis Vogel has responded in opposition to the motion and the matter is ripe for disposition. Furthermore, the parties have not consented to the jurisdiction of the magistrate judge. The motion must, therefore, be dealt with by way of recommendation. For the following reasons, it will be recommended that the court grant Defendants' motion to dismiss.
On October 12, 2007, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint against Defendants, asserting claims for copyright infringement under the Copyright Act (Count 1), false designation of origin under the Lanham Act (Count 2), as well as a state law claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices (Count 3). Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief and damages. Plaintiff alleges that in the early 1980s he was asked to author a section in a medical textbook titled Pathology, which was published by Defendants Wolters Kluwer Health, Inc. d/b/a Lippincott Williams & Wilkins, Wolters Kluwer United States, Inc., and Wolters Kluwer U.S. Corporation (collectively referred to as “Wolters”). (Am.Compl.¶ 13.) Plaintiff authorized Wolters to publish the material he authored in the first edition of Pathology. (Am.Compl.¶ 14.) Plaintiff further alleges that Wolters subsequently asked him to update his material for the subsequent second and third editions of Pathology . (Am. Compl. ¶¶ 19 & 23.) Plaintiff alleges that he updated his section in the second edition of Pathology for Wolters, and he co-authored an update of his section in the third edition. (Am.Compl.¶¶ 19, 23-24.) Plaintiff states that he never authorized Wolters to use the material he authored or co-authored for anything other than publication in the first through the third editions of Pathology. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 15, 19, & 25.)
Plaintiff's claims relate to the publication of the fourth edition of Pathology and the distribution of the material in it by Wolters. Plaintiff alleges that Wolters published a fourth edition of Pathology containing a section on neuropathology that substantially copied the text allegedly authored by Plaintiff, including images that Plaintiff had selected, compiled, and provided to Wolters for use in the earlier editions of Pathology. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 32.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Dr. John Trojanowski was improperly listed as the sole author of this section in the fourth edition of Pathology. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 36.) Plaintiff similarly asserts that he has reviewed a “proof” of a fifth edition of Pathology that also contains materials authored by him, which he contends are being incorrectly attributed to Dr. Trojanowski. fn.1 (See Am. Compl. ¶ 50.) Based on the foregoing allegations, Plaintiff asserts a claim for copyright infringement relating to the fourth edition of Pathology . (See Am. Compl. ¶ 58.) Plaintiff also asserts a claim for false designation of origin relating to Wolters' listing of Dr. Trojanowski as the author of the section at issue in the fourth edition of Pathology. (See Am. Compl. ¶ 65.) Finally, Plaintiff asserts a claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 72-75 .) Plaintiff brings all three claims against both the Wolters Defendants as well as Dr. Trojanowski.
In the motion to dismiss, Defendants ask the court to (1) dismiss the false designation of origin claim for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) dismiss the unfair and deceptive trade practices claim as preempted by the Copyright Act, also under Rule 12(b)(6); and (3) dismiss Dr. Trojanowksi as a Defendant based on lack of personal jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(2).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In ruling on a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim, it must be recalled that the purpose of a
12(b)(6) motion is to test the sufficiency of the
complaint, not to decide the merits of the action. Schatz v.
Generally, the court looks
only to the complaint itself to ascertain the propriety of a motion to dismiss.
See George v. Kay, 632 F.2d 1103, 1106 (4th Cir.1980).
A plaintiff need not plead detailed evidentiary facts, and a complaint is
sufficient if it will give a defendant fair notice of what the plaintiff's
claim is and the grounds upon which it rests. See Bolding v. Holshouser, 575 F.2d 461, 464 (4th
Cir.1978). This duty of fair notice under Rule 8(a) requires the plaintiff to
allege, at a minimum, the necessary facts and grounds that will support his
right to relief. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 1964-65
(2007). As the Supreme Court has recently instructed, although detailed
facts are not required, “a plaintiff's obligation to provide the grounds of his
entitlement to relief requires more than labels and conclusions, and a
formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”
I. Defendants' Contention that Plaintiff's False Designation of Origin Claim is Barred under Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp.
Defendants first contend that Plaintiff's “false designation of origin” claim is barred under the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003). For the following reasons, I agree.
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act provides, in pertinent part:
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which-(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person ... shall be liable in a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a). In Count II of the Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' attribution of authorship to Defendant Dr. Trojanowski of a section in the fourth edition of Pathology and the unauthorized use of Plaintiff's name on the Acknowledgments page of the fourth edition constitutes a violation of section 43(a). (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 65-71.) More specifically, Plaintiff alleges, among other things, that
The Defendants' attribution of the authorship of [Plaintiff's] work to Dr. John Q. Trojanowski creates a false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact that is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of the origin of the text and compilation of images.
The false designations of origin and of [Plaintiff's] contributions to Pathology and the chapter on neuropathology contained therein has created a likelihood of confusion among the consuming public as to the true authorship of the work that [Plaintiff] provided and that has been used in the fourth and revised fourth editions of Pathology and will create the same effect with respect to the fifth edition if published in its current or any substantially similar form.
Defendants' unauthorized use of [Plaintiff's] name in their ‘Acknowledgments' page and their use of Dr. Trojanowski's name in connection with [Plaintiff's] own work and work derived from that of [Plaintiff], as well as the listing of [Plaintiff] as a ‘contributor’ to the revised fourth edition of Pathology, is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of the origin of the fourth and revised fourth editions of Pathology. (See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 65-67.)
Plaintiff's Lanham Act claim is clearly foreclosed by the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23 (2003). In that case, Plaintiff Dastar copied Defendant Fox's Crusade television series, made minor modifications, and manufactured and sold its own series of videotapes called Campaigns. See id. at 31. Fox and two of its licensees sued Dastar, alleging copyright infringement and that Dastar's sale of Campaigns without proper credit to the Crusade television series constituted a violation of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. See id. at 27. In determining whether Fox and its licensees could state a claim for false designation of origin under section 43, the Court observed that the viability of the plaintiffs' claim hinged on the meaning of “origin of goods.” See id. at 31. The Court stated that:
reading the phrase “origin of goods” in the Lanham Act in accordance with the Act's common-law foundations (which were not designed to protect originality or creativity), and in light of the copyright and patent laws (which were ), we conclude that the phrase refers to the producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and not to the author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in those goods.
Applying Dastar to the facts in this case compels a conclusion that Plaintiff cannot state a claim under the Lanham Act. That is, just as Dastar was the “origin” of the goods at issue in Dastar (the Campaign videotapes), Wolters was the “origin” of the goods at issue here (the different editions of the book Pathology ). Plaintiff contends, however, that Dastar must be narrowly construed to bar Lanham Act claims only where the original copyright has expired. Plaintiff contends that the “critical element” in Dastar was that the material copied was already in the public domain and free to be copied. (Pl.'s Br. 14.) Thus, according to Plaintiff here, the plaintiff in Dastar was effectively attempting to use the Lanham Act to achieve a result forbidden under copyright law: preventing publication of a public domain work. Plaintiff contends that here, however, the “subject work is not and never has been in the public domain, nor did Defendants have the authorization to copy [Plaintiff's] work for the fourth edition, the revised fourth edition, or the fifth edition of Pathology.” (Pl.'s Br. 14.) Plaintiff contends that he does not seek to extend his copyright interest under the guise of the Lanham Act and that Dastar does not bar his Lanham Act claim.
of Dastar is incorrect. First, the Court's holding in
Dastar did not turn on whether the work was in the
public domain. Rather, the
As Defendants note, other
courts have interpreted Dastar as finding that
section 43(a) does not protect the merely communicative aspects of goods apart
from the goods themselves. In Zyla v. Wadsworth, Div.
of Thomson Corp., 360 F.3d 243 (1st Cir.2004), for instance, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit affirmed dismissal of a section 43(a) claim
similar to the claim asserted by Plaintiff in this case. In Zyla,
Gail Zyla and Marie Struble
co-authored the second and third editions of a college textbook. See id. at 246. Zyla withdrew from the
project, and the fourth edition was published with Struble
listed as the sole author and with Zyla's name listed
in the acknowledgments section. See id. at 248-49. Zyla sued the textbook publisher and Struble,
alleging that the fourth edition incorporated her work without her permission
and without appropriate attribution. See id. at 246.
Affirming the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the
defendants, the First Circuit concluded that “ Dastar controls here and bars Zyla's
Lanham Act claim.”
In sum, because Dastar bars Plaintiff's claim for false designation of origin, the court should dismiss this claim. fn.3
II. Defendants' Contention that Plaintiff's Claim for Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices Is Preempted by the Copyright Act
Defendants next contend that Plaintiff's claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1 is preempted by the Copyright Act. For the following reasons, I agree.
Section 301(a) of the Copyright Act provides:
On and after January 1, 1978, all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of copyright as specified by section 106 in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, whether created before or after that date and whether published or unpublished, are governed exclusively by this title. Thereafter, no person is entitled to any such right or equivalent right in any such work under the common law or statutes of any State.
§ 301(a). The Fourth Circuit has
held that section 301 of the Copyright Act preempts state law claims if the
work is “within the scope of the subject-matter of copyright” ... and “the
rights granted under state law” must be “equivalent to any exclusive rights
within the scope of federal copyright....”
Plaintiff's state law claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices rests on the same conduct underlying the copyright infringement claim-the alleged copying of material purportedly authored by Plaintiff, and the distribution of the fourth edition of Pathology containing this material. The fourth edition of Pathology is clearly a work “within the subject matter of copyright,” and the purported state law rights that Plaintiff seeks to enforce are equivalent to the “exclusive rights within the scope of federal copyright.” Thus, Plaintiff's state law claim for unfair and deceptive trade practices is preempted by copyright law, and the court should dismiss this claim. Accord Iconbazaar, L.L.C. v. Am. Online, Inc., 308 F.Supp.2d 630, 637 (M.D.N.C.2004) (finding a claim under N.C. Gen.Stat. § 75-1.1 preempted by copyright law and stating: “While there may be extra elements of fraud or deceit in any given unfair trade practices claim, there are no additional elements required in order to state an unfair trade practices claim than there are required to state a copyright claim. Accordingly, the state law claim is preempted by federal copyright law.”) (emphasis in original); see also Microstrategy, Inc. v. Netsolve, Inc., 368 F.Supp.2d 533, 535 (E.D.Va.2005) (holding that conversion and unjust enrichment claims were preempted by the Copyright Act, since they were not “qualitatively different” from a copyright claim because they contained no “extra element” beyond those necessary to show copyright infringement).
Plaintiff contends, however, that he alleges an “extra element of deception” and “[t]he focus of [Plaintiff's] § 75-1.1 claim is the Defendant[s'] continued unfair, false, misleading, and deceptive acts and practices after notice” of the copyright infringement. (Pl.'s Br. 19.) Plaintiff contends that “[e]ven after some or all of the Defendants were expressly aware that Defendants' use of [Plaintiff's] copyrighted work in any form was unauthorized, ... Defendants continued to make available for sale the fourth edition of Pathology, unaltered in any form and CDs and/or a DVD Image Bank containing all or part of [Plaintiff's] copyrighted work.” (Pl.'s Br. 19-20.) Plaintiff contends that “[n]either of the Defendants tried to contact [Plaintiff] about the revision of the fourth or fifth editions of Pathology, ” despite that Plaintiff's location was well known to those involved in preparing the revised edition of Pathology. (Pl.'s Br. 20.) Finally, Plaintiff notes that this court has found in at least one case that an unfair and deceptive trade practices claim was not preempted by the Copyright Act. In Baldine v. Furniture Comfort Corp., 956 F.Supp. 580, 587 (M.D.N.C.1996), for instance, the court found that where separate allegations of fraud constituted the most substantial part of a § 75-1.1 claim that also involved copyright infringement, the § 75-1.1 claim was not preempted.
Plaintiff's contention is
without merit. It is true that this court found no preemption in Baldine. In Baldine, however, in
addition to alleging copyright infringement, the plaintiff also alleged that
the defendant fraudulently told the plaintiff that he would pay her to work on
a design center, while knowing that he had no intention of paying her, and
instead that he planned all along for her to do the design work so that he
could then use it without having to pay her for it. See Baldine,
956 F.Supp. at 587. This court stated that “[f]alse
representations made by [Defendant] ... for the purpose of obtaining
[Plaintiff's] design with intent to use it without paying for it would
constitute a viable claim under 75-1.1 since the fraud and not the actual
copyright violation would be the gravamen of the claim.”
III. Whether the Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over Defendant Dr. John Trojanowski
Defendant Dr. Trojanowski is a
When a court's exercise of
personal jurisdiction is challenged pursuant to a Rule 12(b)(2)
motion, the plaintiff must prove the existence of a ground for jurisdiction by
a preponderance of the evidence. Combs v. Bakker, 886 F.2d 673, 676 (4th
Cir.1989). If jurisdiction turns on disputed facts, the court may conduct an
evidentiary hearing, or postpone ruling on the motion pending receipt of
evidence relating to jurisdiction at trial.
To determine whether
personal jurisdiction is proper, the court must engage in a two-part inquiry.
First, the long-arm statute of
(1) the defendant has created a substantial connection to the forum state by action purposefully directed toward the forum state or otherwise invoking the benefits and protections of the laws of the state; and (2) the exercise of jurisdiction based on those minimum contacts would not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, taking into account such factors as (a) the burden on the defendant, (b) the interests of the forum state, (c) the plaintiff's interest in obtaining relief, (d) the efficient resolution of controversies as between states, and (e) the shared interests of the several states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.
Lesnick, 35 F.3d at 945-46.
Finally, personal jurisdiction may be exercised either specifically or
generally. Slaughter v. Life Connection of
A. Whether the Court May
Assert Personal Jurisdiction over Defendant Trojanowski
Plaintiff first contends
that the court may assert specific personal jurisdiction over Defendant Trojanowski under the following sections of
(1) Local Presence or Status.-In any action, whether the claim arises within or without this State, in which a claim is asserted against a party who when service of process is made upon such party: ....
d. Is engaged in substantial activity within this State, whether such activity is wholly interstate, intrastate, or otherwise.....
(3) Local Act or Omission.-In any action claiming injury to person or property or for wrongful death within or without this State arising out of an act or omission within this State by the defendant.
(4) Local Injury; Foreign Act.-In any action for wrongful death occurring within this State or in any action claiming injury to person or property within this State arising out of an act or omission outside this State by the defendant, provided in addition that at or about the time of the injury either:
a. Solicitation or services activities were carried on within this State by or on behalf of the defendant;
b. Products, materials or thing processed, serviced or manufactured by the defendant were used or consumed, within this State in the ordinary course of trade.
N.C. Gen.Stat. §
1-75.4. First, with respect to section 1-75.4(1) (“Local Presence or Status”),
Plaintiff contends that Dr. Trojanowski is engaged in
substantial activity within
In further support of his
argument that Dr. Trojanowksi has engaged in
substantial activity within North Carolina, Plaintiff notes that Dr. Trojanowski is an associate editor of an online journal,
Alzheimer's & Dementia, which publishes articles that are circulated in
North Carolina and other states. (Pl.'s Br. 9.)
Plaintiff notes that the journal's editorial board includes five members from
Chapel Hill and
Next, with respect to Dr. Trojanowski's contacts under section 1-75.4(3) (“Local
Injury; Foreign Act”), Plaintiff contends that Dr. Trojanowski
circulated or caused to be circulated in this district the manuscript “he
admittedly provided to Defendants Wolters, knowing
that it would be published in Pathology, and intending that it be circulated
into all the jurisdictions where Pathology was to be sold.” (
Finally, with respect to Dr. Trojanowski's contacts under section 1-75.4(4) (“Local Act or Omission”), Plaintiff asserts that by copying Plaintiff's work and by providing it to the publisher Wolters, and by affiliating himself with its publication in Pathology and by serving as an associate editor of Pathology, Dr. Trojanowski
placed the infringing and misattributed work into the
stream of commerce aimed at the Middle District of North Carolina, where both [Plaintiff]
himself, as well as multiple medical schools and medical students-the intended
audience for the work-are located. .... With four major medical schools in
North Carolina, three of them located in the Middle District of North Carolina,
and Defendants Wolters marketing and selling to
promote the textbook domestically through direct mail, advertising, bookstores,
and the internet, Dr. Trojanowski knew or should have
known the Middle District of North Carolina was a likely destination of the
book, that he would cause harm in that District, and that he would receive
benefit from the wrongful acts that he caused and contributed to in that
or services activities” including solicitations of book purchases as well as
providing downloadable copies of the infringing and falsely attributed copy of
Pathology, occurred in the Middle District of North Carolina, made possible by
and conducted on behalf of Dr. Trojanowski since he
was and is legally responsible for those actions. Likewise, “products,”
including the chapter provided to Defendants Wolters
by Dr. Trojanowski and the copies of Pathology into
which that chapter was placed, were used and consumed in this state as
Pathology was sold by Defendant Wolters in
B. Whether Asserting Personal Jurisdiction over Defendant Trojanowski Would Offend Notions of Due Process
In addition to contending
engaged in regular, continuous and systematic contacts with
the Middle District of North Carolina. He posts lectures for downloading here,
posts articles and comments for downloading by North Carolina readers,
co-authors articles with North Carolina physicians, contributes to numerous
books and articles circulated and sold in the district, and has solicited and
obtained a substantial grant from North Carolina Rotarians. These contacts are
sufficient to establish general jurisdiction over Dr. Trojanowski.
purposefully copied Dr. Vogel's work, purposefully concealed the origin of the
work, and purposefully and falsely portrayed himself as the source and origin
of the work, and placed it into the stream of commerce knowing that it was
targeted toward health care professionals and would be marketed to the three
medical schools in the Middle District of North Carolina as well as to their
students and faculty in the forum. Dr. Trojanowski should
have expected to be haled into
I find that this court may not assert personal jurisdiction over Dr. Trojanowski. In sum, Plaintiff cites the following contacts with North Carolina in support of this court's assertion of personal jurisdiction over Dr. Trojanowski: (1) Dr. Trojanowski's submission of a manuscript for a single chapter in Wolters' Pathology textbook; (2) Wolters' act of crediting Dr. Trojanowski with an associate editor title; (3) Wolters' sales of the Pathology textbook to medical centers and students in North Narolina; (4) Dr. Trojanowski's posting of research results, lectures, and discussions of medical topics unrelated to this case on internet web sites; (5) Dr. Trojanowski's participation in a grant application to an organization that was formed by rotary chapters and officers in several states (of which North Carolina is merely one); (6) a presentation by Dr. Trojanowski at Duke University on Alzheimer's disease; and (7) Dr. Trojanowski's co-authorship of articles unrelated to this matter with professors at Duke University, which involved nothing more than emails and calls to professors in North Carolina. ( See Trojanowski Supp. Decl. ¶ 12.)
First, as for the exercise
of specific personal jurisdiction, as noted Plaintiff must show that the
controversy between the parties is related to or arises out of a defendant's
contacts with the forum. See Woods Int'l, Inc. v. McRoy, 436 F.Supp.2d 744, 748 (M.D.N.C.2006).
Plaintiff's claims do not arise out of any activities in
In sum, Plaintiff has not
shown that the court may assert jurisdiction against Dr. Trojanowski
based on specific jurisdiction. In other words, Dr. Trojanowski
has sufficiently shown that he has undertaken no action by which he
“purposefully avail[ed] [himself] of the privilege of
conducting activities within [
Nor has Plaintiff shown that
Dr. Trojanowski's contacts with
Furthermore, Dr. Trojanowski has asserted in his Declaration that he has
For the reasons stated herein, it is RECOMMENDED that the court GRANT Defendants' motion to dismiss (docket no. 23). Therefore, the court should dismiss Plaintiff's claims for false designation of origin and unfair and deceptive trade practices. Furthermore, because the court may not assert personal jurisdiction over Defendant Trojanowski, he should be dismissed as a Defendant. Thus, if the court adopts this Memorandum Opinion and Recommendation, the sole remaining claim will be a claim for copyright infringement against the Wolters Defendants.
fn.1. Plaintiff does not appear to assert any claims related to the fifth edition of Pathology. ( See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 50, 58.)
fn.2. Plaintiff cites this court's decision in Universal
Furniture, International, Inc. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc. to support his argument that he has a
Lanham Act claim. No. 1:04cv977, 2007 WL 1232075, at *6 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 26,
2007). This court, however, allowed the Lanham Act claim to survive in
Universal Furniture because the defendant “acquired actual pieces of
[Plaintiff's] furniture and began displaying, offering for sale, and selling
these items of furniture as though they were the collections and designs of
fn.3. I note that the Amended Complaint also purports to
state a claim for false designation of origin under
fn.4. The Fourth Circuit has indicated that
fn.5. In his brief, Plaintiff focuses on Defendant Trojanowski's contacts with this judicial district in
particular, but Plaintiff need only show contacts with the State of
fn.6. In addition, as Defendants note, even if the court were to assume that Dr. Trojanowski was an employee of the Wolters Defendants, it is well established that in a personal jurisdiction analysis, the contacts of a corporation must be analyzed separately from any contacts by officers or employees of the corporation. See May Apparel Group, Inc. v. AVA Import-Export, Inc., 902 F.Supp. 93, 97 (M.D.N.C.1995) (“It is also well established that a corporation is a separate and distinct legal entity [from] its officers and directors. Thus, corporate employees are not subject to personal jurisdiction, even as to the employee's corporate activities unless the employee has sufficient minimum contacts with the forum.”) (citations omitted).